

# Android apps in sheep's clothing

April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015

Tobias Ospelt, modzero AG



SIGS Special Event –

"It's not a joke - it can happen"





- 6 IT security experts
- We do all areas of technical HW & SW security analysis
  - Penetration Testing, Crypto, Web, embedded devices, etc.




Chaos Computer Club  
Der deutsche Staatstrojaner wurde geknackt

# Android

- Android has about 62% market share

Version	Codename	API	Distribution
2.2	Froyo	8	0.4%
2.2.2-2.2.7	Gingerbread	10	0.9%
4.0.3-4.0.4	Ice Cream Sandwich	15	0.9%
4.1.2	Jelly Bean	16	17.2%
4.2.2		17	19.4%
4.3		18	5.9%
4.4	KitKat	19	40.9%
5.0	Lollipop	21	3.3%



Data collected during a 7-day period ending on March 2, 2015.


Any versions with less than 0.1% distribution are not shown.




We are going to see a User  
Interface (UI) attack today

History of UI attacks


# Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay




# Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay



# Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay



# Microsoft Windows 90ies overlay






# Modern Windows Overlays



## Remote Overlay Toolkit Makes Online Banking Fraud Easy

By [Eduard Kovacs](#) on January 14, 2015



A new toolkit discovered late last year by researchers at IBM Trusteer allows even less skilled cybercriminals to steal online banking credentials and abuse them for fraudulent transactions.


The toolkit, dubbed **KL-Remote**, is used for remote overlay attacks which enable cybercrooks to access online banking accounts directly from victims' computers without raising too much suspicion.

The threat has been noticed in Brazil, a country where, according to studies, criminals made


significant gains from phishing attacks and social engineering over the last few years to obtain valuable information.

The threat takes a screenshot of the banking website and displays it to the user. The cybercriminal then uses the tool to push a message on top of that image. The message is different for each website and it instructs victims to enter the information needed by the attacker to gain access to the banking account. This information can include usernames and passwords, and one-time passwords generated by security devices provided by banks to their

# Browser Clickjacking



# Android overlays



# Overlaying Android apps


Android apps in sheep's clothing

# What

- Stealing credentials
  - When adding a Google account to Android
  - Or from all other apps with logins
    - Enterprise containers (Good, MobileIron, etc.)
    - Password safes
    - Social media, etc.
- Manipulating sensitive data that is displayed
  - Two-factor authentication mobile banking transaction signing



# How




- What about sandboxing on the User Interface (UI) level?

# Prerequisites for our attack

- Installed malware app on phone
- Permissions
  - *GET\_TASKS* (must)
  - *SYSTEM\_ALERT\_WINDOW* (recommended but optional)
  - *RECEIVE\_BOOT\_COMPLETED* (optional)
  - *INTERNET* (optional)


# Demo: Stealing Skype credentials



# How did it work?

- Exactly when the Skype app is opening the login screen, we bring our app to the foreground and show our faked login screen

# Mobile banking transaction signing



Überprüfen

Bitte prüfen Sie

ÜBERWEISUNG	
IBAN	DE55555555555555555555
BETRAG	1337,42 EUR


photoTAN

7351946

Bitte geben Sie die TAN im Online-Banking ein, wenn die angezeigten Daten korrekt sind.



# Enterprise containers – Example: MobileIron



# Is it fixed?

Hint: won't fix

# First response Android Security Team

Let's talk about permissions...

"[...] We don't consider this behavior to be a flaw in the Android security model. [...] the attack requires the victim to knowingly install an app that has permission to monitor foreground applications. [...] Google Play analyzes apps that get submitted [...] for phishing and other potentially harmful behavior. [...]"

...and analyzing for harmful behavior.

# Permission system is broken

- There is no opt-in/opt-out
  - Give it all permissions it wants or uninstall it
- Cyanogenmod (an alternative Android version) has permission opt-in/opt-out called "Privacy Guard". Why not on Android?



# Facebook

needs access to



Device & app history



Identity



Contacts/Calendar



Location



Uses the device's location



SMS



Phone



Photos/Media/Files



Camera/Microphone




Wi-Fi connection information



Google play

ACCEPT






# Facebook

Facebook 

UNINSTALL

UPDATE



Downloads



21,775,003 



Social




Similar

## WHAT'S NEW

- Like posts, photos and Pages when you're offline
- Remove tags you've created
- Remove tags of yourself that your friends have created





Facebook

Facebook 

Remove Usability

Remove Security



Downloads



21,775,003 



Social



Similar

#### WHAT'S NEW



- Like posts, photos and Pages when you're offline
- Remove tags you've created
- Remove tags of yourself that your friends have created



# Google is scanning for harmful behavior?

- What about other app stores?
- The malware app will be disguised as a legitimate app
  - Functionality will require those permissions
- Other malware made it in the Play store
- Our malware code can be loaded after the app is already in the store


# Talking about quality assurance in the Google Play store...

	<b>asdf</b> 길선택 / LERNEN <a href="#">INSTALLIEREN</a>	asdfsadf asdfasdf
	<b>Quick Dial BETA</b> asdfsadf / asdfsadf ★★★★☆ (1) <a href="#">INSTALLIEREN</a>	Quick Dial is a widget that shows you the people you contact most often and provides you with a quick means to call them, send them messages, emails or perform any other...
Test app Ignore PLZ	<b>Test App alla</b> WITCH DEV / BIBLIOTHEKEN & DEMOS <a href="#">INSTALLIEREN</a>	asdf asd asdf fads afds ad afds a a fads afad sadfd
DBG	<b>asdfg</b> 길선택 / LERNEN <a href="#">INSTALLIEREN</a>	adfg asdf

"Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, users will pick dancing pigs every time."

— Edward Felten (Securing Java)

# Demo: I just couldn't resist



# I just couldn't resist

- Uploaded yesterday
- This particular demo works only on LG g3 with Android 5
- Download the malware:
  - <https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ch.example.dancingpigs>

# I just couldn't resist



## Dancing pig

ch.example.dancingpigs

APP REJECTED

Statistics

Ratings & Reviews

Crashes & ANRs

Optimization Tips

APK

Store Listing

Content Rating

Pricing & Distribution

In-app Products

Services & APIs



### APP REJECTED

Your app submission has been rejected for a violation of the Google Play Developer Program Policy regarding [Intellectual Property](#). If this submission was an update to an existing app, the version published prior to this update is still available in Google Play. Please review the [copyright infringement](#) and [impersonation](#) help articles, then remove unlicensed images from your app and/or listing and resubmit. Additional details have been sent to your account owner's email address.

## STORE LISTING

### PRODUCT DETAILS

Fields marked with \* need to be filled before publishing.

English (United States) – en-US

Manage translations ▼

#### Title\*

English (United States) – en-US

Dancing pig

11 of 30 characters

#### Short description\*

English (United States) – en-US

This is a very cute dancing pig showing whenever you are not in an app

70 of 80 characters

#### Full description\*


English (United States) – en-US

This is a very cute dancing pig showing whenever you are not in an app. My first try for an app, I hope you enjoy it.



Is the attack still feasible on  
Android 5?

# Demo: Android 5.0.2 (verified on 5.1)





What about BlackBerry?



# Blackberry

- Blackberry supports Android apps
- You can attack another Android app on Blackberry
  - With our technique you are not able to figure out which native Blackberry app is in the foreground

# Blackberry



# Blackberry – spot the permission difference



# Countermeasures

- If you have a HTML5 app (one WebView) the attack is "harder"
  - Android 5 situation on all Android versions

# Summary

- Is this technique rocket-science? Not at all
- Does it matter? Yes, the impact is huge
- Android app separation is broken
  - Don't trust the sandboxing promises
- Bring-your-own-device is still a bad idea from a security perspective
  - private apps and business apps/data
- Come and play with devices here at the front



# Thank you

- <http://www.modzero.ch/modlog/index.html>
- Twitter: @floyd\_ch
- Twitter: @mod0
- <http://floyd.ch>



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